From 4568d28361d9e691872b6e6ae5e10907b302c338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bfahrenfort Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 12:10:33 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] Quartz sync: Feb 28, 2024, 12:10 PM --- content/Essays/ai-infringement.md | 15 +- content/Essays/content-death.md | 10 + content/Programs I Like/rust-macros.md | 68 + content/Projects/rsgistry.md | 27 + content/Projects/rss-foss.md | 13 + content/Resources/Outlines/civpro.md | 1751 +++++++++++++++++++++ content/Resources/Outlines/home.md | 15 + content/Updates/2024/feb.md | 2 +- content/index.md | 6 +- content/templates/new-note.md | 3 +- quartz.layout.ts | 11 +- quartz/components/pages/FolderContent.tsx | 2 +- quartz/components/pages/TagContent.tsx | 8 +- 13 files changed, 1917 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 content/Essays/content-death.md create mode 100644 content/Programs I Like/rust-macros.md create mode 100644 content/Projects/rsgistry.md create mode 100644 content/Projects/rss-foss.md create mode 100644 content/Resources/Outlines/civpro.md create mode 100644 content/Resources/Outlines/home.md diff --git a/content/Essays/ai-infringement.md b/content/Essays/ai-infringement.md index 45aeaf4db..20c00f312 100644 --- a/content/Essays/ai-infringement.md +++ b/content/Essays/ai-infringement.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ I also discuss policy later in the essay. Certain policy points are instead made In short, there's a growing sentiment against copyright in general. Copyright can enable centralization of rights when paired with a capitalist economy, which is what we've been historically experiencing with the advent of record labels/publishing companies. It's even statutorily enshrined as the "work-for-hire" doctrine. AI has the potential to be an end-run around these massive copyright repositories' rights, which many people see as beneficial. -However, this argument forgets that intangible rights are not *yet* so centralized that independent rights-holders have ceased to exist. While AI will indeed harm central rights-holders, it will also affect individual creators and the bargaining power of creators that choose to work with the central institutions. For those against copyright as a whole, this is a neutral factor to the disestablishment of copyright. Due to my roots in the indie and open-source communities, I'd much rather keep their/our/**your** rights intact. +However, this argument forgets that intangible rights are not *yet* so centralized that independent rights-holders have ceased to exist. While AI will indeed affect central rights-holders, it will also harm individual creators and the bargaining power of those that choose to work with the central institutions. For those against copyright as a whole, this is a neutral factor to the disestablishment of copyright. Due to my roots in the indie music and open-source communities, I'd much rather keep their/our/**your** rights intact. Reconciling the two views, I'm sympathetic to arguments against specific parts of the US's copyright regime as enforced by the courts, such as the way fair use is statutorily worded. We as a voting population have the power to compel our representatives to enact reforms that take the threat of ultimate centralization into account, and can even work to break down what's already here. But I don't think that AI should be the impetus for arguments against the system as a whole. ## The Legal Argument @@ -55,18 +55,23 @@ One common legal argument against training as infringement is that the AI extrac Everything AI starts with a dataset. And most AI models will start with the easiest, most freely available resource: the internet. Hundreds of different scrapers exist with the goal of collecting as much of the internet as possible to train modern AI (or previously, machine learners, neural networks, or even just classifiers/cluster models). Acquiring data for training is an unethical mess. **In human terms**, scrapers like Common Crawl will take what they want, without asking (unless you know the magic word to make it go away, or just [[Projects/Obsidian/digital-garden#Block the bot traffic!|block it from the get-go]]), and without providing immediately useful service in return like a search engine. For more information on the ethics of AI datasets, read my tidbit on [[Essays/plagiarism#AI shouldn't disregard the need for attribution|🅿️ the need for AI attribution]], and have a look at the work of [Dr. Damien Williams](https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=riv547sAAAAJ&hl=en) ([Mastodon](https://ourislandgeorgia.net/@Wolven)). -- Sidebar: and acquiring this data is copyright infringement too, as unlicensed copying. The case is tremendously stupid: [*MAI Systems v. Peak Computer*](https://casetext.com/case/mai-systems-corp-v-peak-computer-inc) holds that RAM copying (ie, moving a file from somewhere to a computer's memory) is an unlicensed copy. As of today, it's still good law, for some reason. Note that every single file you open in Word, a PDF reader, or your browser is moved to your memory before it gets displayed on the screen. Bring it up at trivia night, just using your computer is copyright infringement! +- Sidebar: and acquiring this data is copyright infringement too, as unlicensed copying. The case is tremendously stupid: [*MAI Systems v. Peak Computer*](https://casetext.com/case/mai-systems-corp-v-peak-computer-inc) holds that RAM copying (ie, moving a file from somewhere to a computer's memory) is an unlicensed copy. As of today, it's still good law, for some reason. Note that every single file you open in Word, a PDF reader, or your browser is moved to your memory before it gets displayed on the screen. Bring it up at trivia night: just using your computer is copyright infringement! But then a company actually has to train an AI on that data. What copyright issues does that entail? First, let's talk about The Chinese Room. [The Chinese Room](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/) is a philosophical exercise authored by John Searle where the (in context, American) subject is locked in a room and receives symbols in Chinese slipped under the door. A computer program tells the subject what Chinese outputs to send back out under the door based on patterns and combinations of the input. The subject does not understand Chinese. Yet, it **appears** as if whoever is inside it has a firm understanding of the language to an observer of Searle's room. -Searle's exercise was at the time an extension of the Turing test designed to refute the theory of "Strong AI." At the time that theory was well-named, but today the AI it was talking about is not even considered AI by most. Strong AI was the theory that a computer could be programmed to However, it can be easily applied to many other programming fields—notably compiler design—with the most pertinent here being natural language processing. The hypothetical Strong AI was a computer program capable of understanding its inputs and outputs, and importantly *why* it took each action. A Weak AI, on the other hand, was just the Chinese Room. Searle reasoned that the "understanding" of a Strong AI was inherently biological, thus one could not presently exist. -- Note that some computer science sources like [IBM](https://www.ibm.com/topics/strong-ai) have taken to using Strong AI to denote AGI, which was only a sufficient, not necessary, quality of a philosophical "intelligent" intelligence. +Searle's exercise was at the time an extension of the Turing test designed to refute the theory of "Strong AI." At the time that theory was well-named, but today the AI it was talking about is not even considered AI by most. The hypothetical Strong AI was a computer program capable of understanding its inputs and outputs, and importantly *why* it took each action to solve a problem, with the ability to apply that understanding to new problems (much like our modern conception of Artificial General Intelligence). A Weak AI, on the other hand, was just the Chinese Room: taking inputs and producing outputs among defined rules. Searle reasoned that the "understanding" of a Strong AI was inherently biological, thus one could not presently exist. +- Note that some computer science sources like [IBM](https://www.ibm.com/topics/strong-ai) have taken to using Strong AI to denote only AGI, which was a sufficient, not necessary quality of a philosophical "intelligent" intelligence. +Generative AI models from different sources are architected in a variety of different ways, but they all boil down to one abstract process, where an absurdly massive number of parameters are tuned to the exact values that produce the most desirable output. (note: [CGP Grey's video on AI](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9OHn5ZF4Uo) and its follow-up are mainly directed towards neural networks, but do apply to LLMs, and do a great job illustrating this). ==more== +Modern generative AI, like the statistical data models and machine learners before it, is a Weak AI. And weak AIs use weak AI data. +- Sidebar: this point doesn't consider an AI's ability to summarize a work since the section focuses on how the *training* inputs are used rather than how the output is generated from real input. It's confusing, but these are two linked concepts when talking about machine learning rather than direct results of each other. Especially when you introduce concepts like "temperature", which is a degree of randomness added to a model's (already variant) choices in response to an input to simulate creativity. +- ...I'll talk about that in the next section. -- The idea and expression being the same may give rise to some claims of merger doctrine; that is, the idea merges with the expression, so it is not copyrightable. That would not be a correct reading of merger doctrine. [*Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.*](https://casetext.com/case/ets-hokin-v-skyy-spirits-inc) makes it clear that the doctrine is more about disregarding the types of works that are low-expressivity by default, and that this "merge" is just a nice name to remember the actual test by. Confusing name, easy doctrine. +#### Detour: point for the observant +The idea and expression being indistinguishable by AI may make one immediately think to merger doctrine; that is, the idea inherent in the work trained on merges with its expression, so it is not copyrightable. That would not be a correct reading of merger doctrine. [*Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.*](https://casetext.com/case/ets-hokin-v-skyy-spirits-inc) makes it clear that the doctrine is more about disregarding the types of works that are low-expressivity by default, and that this "merge" is just a nice name to remember the actual test by. Confusing name, easy doctrine. ### Generation ### Fair Use diff --git a/content/Essays/content-death.md b/content/Essays/content-death.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..db7473124 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Essays/content-death.md @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +--- +title: Content Death +tags: + - essay + - seedling + - meta +date: 2024-02-21 +draft: true +--- +A \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/Programs I Like/rust-macros.md b/content/Programs I Like/rust-macros.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..800f899c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Programs I Like/rust-macros.md @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +--- +title: "🦀 Rust Macros: Enough to be Dangerous" +tags: + - "#programming" + - misc + - seedling +date: 2024-02-28 +lastmod: 2024-02-28 +--- +Rust's [[Programs I Like/functional-programming|functional patterns]] are great, but sometimes you need to get weird. What if you want to construct a struct type, but you (the programmer) don't know what types the fields will be while you're writing this? Rust has you covered in situations just like this one. + +It's important to note that **Rust does not have runtime dynamic typing**. All of this must be done at compile time. That's where the macro system comes in. Unlike C-style macros, it's not pure substitution, it's much more powerful: Rust inserts your code into the AST-manipulation step of the compiler. Rather than `rustc`, *you* parse the tokens and make your own types from them to then generate new tokens to pass to the compiler. +## Prerequisites +See the [Rust Book on procedural macros](https://doc.rust-lang.org/reference/procedural-macros.html). The syntax there is much more complicated because it uses `macro_rules!()`, but pay attention to what a crate has to have to use the macro features and the various types of macros. +## Cardinal syntax +Now, let's ignore the builtin `proc_macro` crate in favor of `proc_quote`. This crate's `quote` macro is the meat of a procedural macro, as it returns what becomes actual code at compile time (a TokenStream). Its expansions are limited but very powerful. Here's a simple example with boilerplate stripped out: + +```rust +let name = &input.ident; +let output = quote! { + impl #name { + pub fn hello_world() -> String { + "Hello World".to_string() + } + } +}; +``` + +This macro creates a function at compile time as a member of the struct in `input` 's implementation that returns a `String` from the slice "Hello World". It expands `name` into the name of the input struct with the `#` operator. + +There's also a way to iterate `Vec<>` inside macros with the `*` repetition operator. This operator has two parts, a body and a separator, but I couldn't find a satisfactory tutorial online. Here's my attempt: +```rust +quote!{ + #(let #some_vec = 5);* +} +``` + +Here, everything inside the `#()` parenthetical will be repeatedly generated for each element of `some_vec`, with `#some_vec` expanding to the element at the current index. Presumably it contains the `Ident` s of some variable names of type `i32` that we want to declare and assign 5 to all of them in our macro. An expansion might look like: +```rust +let x = 5;let y = 5; let z = 5; +``` + +It's okay that it's not pretty because the compiler will see it as valid anyway. +## \#\[proc_macro_derive()\] +[Rust traits](https://doc.rust-lang.org/book/ch10-02-traits.html) are powerful inheritance-like features that let the compiler know it can expect the "deriving" types to behave in the same way. What if you could generate trait implementations with a macro on the deriving type? + +Note that the only thing that can be expanded inside a `quote!` is a base identifier. This is because you can do something like `#newtype_field_name.0` and the `.0` will remain in the generated code. Let's look at a more complicated example that uses that property along with the iterative : +```rust +#[proc_macro_derive()] +//...some boilerplate and parsing of the input struct +// stmts: Vec containing the name of every field of the deriving (input) type that is also present in SomeType + +let name = &input.ident; +let output = quote! { + impl #name { + pub fn from(f: SomeType) -> #name { + #name { + #(#stmts: f.#stmts), * + } + } + } +}; +``` + +This `from` method assumes that every field of SomeType is present in the input type and implements automatic conversion without needing to know either type's full implementation, just because the input type wanted to derive the trait `From` + +### Further Reading +A good case study on deriving proc macros is my project `rsgistry`, which exports several with full boilerplate using `syn` and `quote!` for viewing [here](https://github.com/bfahrenfort/rsgistry/tree/main/macros) with details in the [[Projects/rsgistry|garden entry]]. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/Projects/rsgistry.md b/content/Projects/rsgistry.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..07d405430 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Projects/rsgistry.md @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +--- +title: r/[es]/gistry +tags: + - foss + - "#rust" + - programming + - project + - difficulty-easy + - seedling +date: 2024-02-28 +lastmod: 2024-02-28 +--- +[Repository](https://github.com/bfahrenfort/rsgistry) + +I have a vision that all should take to write a customized, full-stack, ready-to-deploy registry web app for your packages or community extensions is editing a single type. More info to come soon. + +This entry will be a technical overview of my implementation choices and program design. Documentation on actually using the codebase will be hosted in the repository. Enjoy! +- Sidebar: this was advanced for me but it will be extremely easy for someone with limited coding knowledge to fork and deploy in a way that supports their use case. +## Background +I’ve run into the same ecosystem problem in about three different spaces now: there’s a really robust system for **community extensions, but no real way to share them**. Either they’re too trivial for individual GitHub repositories, too non-tech-oriented, or still need some additional metadata hosted online in order to have a good API consumer UX. Thus, I’m adapting a test project into a batteries-included codebase for hosting a registry. API is in Axum and set up to be hosted for free on Shuttle, unsure about the frontend as of yet but looking at Leptos. + +...The name stylization is just a regex joke. +## Implementation Details +### Macros +I'm cultivating a tidbit on [[Programs I Like/rust-macros|Rust Macros]], so feel free to read for a practical introduction to the topic. + +This program works by generating multiple model types, their helper functions, and sql queries all from a single type at compile time. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/Projects/rss-foss.md b/content/Projects/rss-foss.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5af696a39 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Projects/rss-foss.md @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +--- +title: The Future of RSS +tags: + - foss + - project + - seedling +date: 2024-02-14 +--- +RSS is the best and most private way to subscribe to a website, social media account, or more. No site analytics, no page loading, no Javascript, no ads. All the website can see is that you pulled one plaintext file from it. +## Vision +RSS shouldn't just be a one-feed thing. Granularity is key. + +More to come when I get time haha diff --git a/content/Resources/Outlines/civpro.md b/content/Resources/Outlines/civpro.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..123f5a915 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Resources/Outlines/civpro.md @@ -0,0 +1,1751 @@ +--- +title: Civil Procedure - Fall 2022 +tags: +date: 2024-02-19 +draft: true +--- +{ *Any statutes and federal rules mentioned are available for free online, usually through LII. Just google them -ed.* } +## The Personal Jurisdiction Checklist +- { *This is a repetition of information set out in more conventional outline format below used as a quick reference -ed.* } +1. If any of the below apply: no minimum contacts required, jurisdiction is valid + - D implicitly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction (_Hess_) + - D domiciled within the state + - D personally served within the state (_Burnham_) + - Suit arose out of attachment of property, **directly related** to property (_in rem_ or most admiralty, _cf._ _Pennoyer_) + - Forum selection clause or choice-of-law provision that **reasonably** permits suit in this forum (_Burger King_, _Carnival Cruise_) +2. If none of the above apply, look to the long-arm statute (_McGee_): + - California-type (any exercise consistent with DPC) + - Apply minimum contacts test + - Illinois-type (any act on this list is consent to personal jurisdiction) + - Interpreted as illustrative (typical) and like a Cali-type? + - Minimum contacts test + - Interpreted as exhaustive? + - On list? Minimum contacts test now (_WW VW_) + - Not on list? No jurisdiction (but still do minimum contacts test for the points) + - Hybrid (any act on this list or consistent with dpc) + - Minimum contacts test +3. The below do not affect the validity of exercise of personal j + - Unilateral activity within a state by d (_Helicopteros, Hanson_) + - State is ‘center of gravity’ of litigation (_Hanson_) + - All P did was cause an effect in the state _(Kulko_) + - Fortuitous circumstances (instrumentality moved by p) (_WW VW_) + - Chattel as an agent for service of process (_WW VW_) + - Lack of foreseeability of suit, especially if the facts indicate intent to submit to sovereign authority (_Nicastro_) + - Applicable law may be affected, such as the First Amendment (_Calder_) + - P’s contacts/lack thereof with the forum state (_Keeton_) + - A foreign corporation not at home in the US (_Goodyear_, _Daimler_) +4. Examine the “relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation” (_WW VW_) + - Does the suit arise out of the activity within the state (specific jurisdiction)? If so, look for: + - Corporation enjoying “benefits and protections of the laws” (_Amer Radiator_) + - Products enjoying “substantial use and consumption” (_Amer Radiator_) + - “affiliating circumstances” affecting the reasonability of the litigation (_WW VW_) + - Burden on d of litigating in the forum + - P’s interest in convenient relief + - State’s interest in suit + - Interstate judiciary’s interest in resolving the dispute + - Shared interest of multiple states to further social policy (effectively do we want to favor plaintiffs and expand their access to recovery) + - Was the **defendant’s** activity what connected them to the forum (_Walden_)? + - placing products in stream of commerce **plus** other “purposeful availment” to suit (_Asahi_, _Nicastro_) + - a contract **plus** some actions to establish the transaction is not random/fortuitous (_Burger King_) + - child corporation so under the control of a parent that it is the parent’s alter ego _(Daimler_) + - Are the claims unrelated to the activity (general jurisdiction)? If so, look for: + - Systematic and continuous contacts within the forum state (_International Shoe_, _Helicopteros_) +## Choice of Forum +- Strategic concerns + - Jury pool + - Location, opinion, and tightness + - Relationship to judge + - Procedural rules + - Public opinion + - Docket congestion +- Legal concerns + - FRCP 12(b): motions to dismiss on… + - Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 12(b)(1) + - “If the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, they have no authority to adjudicate the claims and defenses.” + - CANNOT WAIVE DEFECTS IN subject-matter jurisdiction, IF NO subject-matter jurisdiction THEN NO CASE + - Diversity Jurisdiction + - “28 U.S.C. 1332: A federal court has jurisdiction over cases where the parties are citizens of different sovereigns and the amount in controversy is over .” + - O: _Strawbridge v. Curtiss_ (1806): complete diversity rule + - Individuals + - _Mas v. Perry_ (1974, 5th cir): domicile is where you intend to return to, if you don’t establish a new domicile you absolutely intend to return to your old one. One domicile is your citizenship, many residences don’t matter. + - Corporations + - 28 usc 1332(c)(1): Corp is citizen of state where it is incorporated and where its principal place of business is + - _Hertz Corp. v. Friend_ (2010, Breyer) + - principal place of business is the nerve center, usually where the corporation’s officers direct the corporation’s activity from + - Total activity test is complex and leads to strange results + - Forms filed by corp are not enough for citizenship to be established (SEC 10-K listing principal offices) + - Partnerships + - _Rose_: citizen of every state the partners are citizens of + - Unincorporated associations + - _Rose_: citizen of every state the members are citizens of + - Parties joined for some purpose of establishing or defeating federal j + - 28 usc 1359: no jurisdiction over action where party was joined for the purpose of giving jurisdiction (collusive joinder) + - _Kramer v. Caribbean Mills_ (1969, Harlan) + - Business transfer followed by suit with some retention of some interest in the suit by transferor can be collusive joinder + - If no interest retained, definitely no collusive joinder + - 28 usc 1359: court cannot hear cases where parties were joined for the sole purpose of conferring j + - _Rose v. Giamatti_ (1989, s.d. ohio) + - cannot defeat removal jurisdiction by adding nondiverse parties + - For diversity jurisdiction purposes, only actual parties with interest in the suit are considered, no nominal parties + - Federal Question Jurisdiction + - “28 U.S.C. 1331: A federal court has jurisdiction over cases arising out of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the united states.” + + - _Amer. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E._ (1992, Souter) + + - sue-or-be-sued provisions in congressional charters that mention the federal judiciary convey original jurisdiction as well as capacity to sue + + - _T.B. Harms Co._ _v. Eliscu_ (1964, 2nd cir): A case may arise under a law if it turns on an interpretation of that law or the law creates the claim (contract claim with copyright as subject does not arise under Copyright Act) + + - Turns on an interpretation + + - _Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Mottley_ (1908, Moody): The federal question must appear on the face of the well-pleaded complaint; asserting in your complaint that the defendant may make a defense and then responding to that defense with the constitution or federal law does not mean arising under j + + - _Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engrg_ (2005, Souter) + + - An essential element of a claim depending on whether a fed statute was violated does convey federal-question jurisdiction, regardless of whether the action itself is from state law + + - This doesn’t affect existing suits because of how rare it is + + - Law creates the claim + + - _Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson_ (1986, Stevens) + + - Four factors involved in fed statutes that create cause of action + + - P part of the class for whose special benefit the law was passed + + - Congressional purpose was to provide cause of action + + - Cause of action would further the purposes of the legislation + + - Cause of action is not traditionally relegated to state law + + - No federal interest in the suit and thus no purpose served by adjudicating it in federal court when it doesn’t have express federal-question jurisdiction + + - P: _Kansas City Title & Trust_: resolution of state claim turning on interpretation of federal statute allows subject-matter jurisdiction (distinguished from the instant case) + + - _Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engrg_ (2005, Souter): state law claims turning on an interpretation of a federal law convey subject-matter jurisdiction implicly, doesn’t overrule _Merrell Dow,_ just adds a test + + - Supplemental Jurisdiction + + - “When two claims arise out of the same case and controversy, one conferring original jurisdiction and the other not, the federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over the latter claim.” + + - 28 USC 1367: codification of black letter from below prior cases, see scheme + + - _Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah Servs._ (2005, Kennedy): as long as class representatives’ claims meet amount in controversy, entire class can be adjudicated over under 1367 if they meet the other diversity requirement + + - “When federal and state claims both arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact, the federal courts have pendent-claim jurisdiction over the state claim.” + + - _UMW v. Gibbs_ (1966, Brennan): examine relationship of claims, convenience, and fairness of litigating state claim in federal court + + - P: _Hurn_: state law claims can be heard in fed ct if they parallel the federal questions (broadened in _Gibbs_) + + - “When a suit is brought against some parties with good jurisdictional basis and some parties with no jurisdictional basis, if the claims against each are not substantially different, the federal courts have pendent-party jurisdiction over the unjustified claims.” + + - 1367, of course + + - _Finley v. U.S._ (1989, Scalia) + + - **OVERRULED** by _Exxon_ and 1367: courts cannot exercise pendent-party jurisdiction when one d has a fed claim and one d (pendent party) has a state claim + + - P: _Aldinger_: federal claims and state claims must not substantially differ to establish pendent jurisdiction + + - One party’s claims being state and the other federal is a substantial difference + + - If no independent jurisdictional basis exists over the pendent parties, cannot establish pendent-party j + + - P: _Owen_: must have diversity jurisdiction to exercise pendent jurisdiction + + - If Congress doesn’t like this body of law they can fix it themselves (**f o r e s h a d o w i n g**) + + - “A defendant can implead any third party with whom they have a claim logically dependent upon the resolution of the case in chief under the federal court’s ancillary jurisdiction.” (3pc is ancillary jurisdiction) + + - Judicial economy and convenience considerations + + - _Owen Equipment & Erection v. Kroger_ (1978, Stewart) + + - 3rd party complaint has to be logically dependent on the case-in-chief + + - Complete diversity is required even after amending pleading to join impleaded party + + - Judicial economy/convenience cannot justify extending ancillary jurisdiction to cover p’s claims against impleaded party as well + + - Removal Jurisdiction + + - 28 USC 1441 _et seq_: see scheme + + - _Carlsbad Tech v. HIF Bio_ (2009, Thomas): lacking jurisdiction and choosing not to use jurisdiction under 1367(c) are distinct, discretionary remands are reviewable + + - Related Procedure + + - RCP 56 (summary judgement) + + - RCP 17 + + - Real party in interest rule + + - Capacity + + - RCP 42 + + - Consolidation + + - RCP 2 (one form of action: civil action) + + - RCP 14 (impleader/third-party practice) + + - Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, 12(b)(2) + + - “In order for a court to issue a binding decision over a defendant, they must have good personal jurisdiction over that defendant, otherwise the decision is invalid and void.” + + - Personal jurisdiction over nonresident + + - Voluntary appearance at court in-state (general jurisdiction) + + - Physical presence within the state (general jurisdiction) + + - (This is the justification for sovereignty over residents) + + - Personal service within the state + + - _Burnham v._ _Super. Ct. of Cali._ (1990, Scalia): “tag” jurisdiction is good, for pete’s sake guys + + - notice by publication properly made + + - Attachment of property at the **outset** of litigation, prior to complaints being filed + + - _Pennoyer v. Neff_ + + - Attachment of personal property is only a justification in proceedings _in rem_ or arising out of attachment + + - Implied consent to personal jurisdiction + + - _Hess v. Pawloski_, specific j + + - States may enact and enforce regulations extending jurisdiction that promote their public interest (such as encouraging exercise of care in one’s action), as long as they do not discriminate unfairly against nonresidents. + + - Minimum contacts + + - “Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants only requires certain minimum contacts be established with the state.” + + - Must be consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” + + - Systematic and continuous actions (general jurisdiction) + + - _Intl Shoe v. State of Washington_ (1945 supreme ct) + + - “presence” within a state for jurisdiction purposes depends on the nature of the activity and its relationship with the laws of the state + + - “quality and nature” of contacts is the test + + - Good jurisdiction over claims where d purposefully directed activity to residents of the state and p’s injuries arose out of or relate to the activity within the state (specific) + + - Good jurisdiction over claims against individuals with systematic and continuous contact with the state (general) + + - _Helicopteros v. Hall_ (1984, Blackmun) + + - Cannot bring suits for claims unrelated to the activity within the state without general jurisdiction + + - Benefits and protections of the laws of the state + + - Burdens and inconveniences on d + + - Nature and quality of acts + + - Some states have asserted jurisdiction with very few contacts + + - _McGee v. Intl Life Insurance_ (1957), specific j + + - One contact can be enough to establish minimum contacts if court wishes to protect state’s interests in its residents + + - State has strong interest in protecting residents from insurance companies + + - _Hanson v. Denckla_ (1958 sup ct) + + - Unilateral activity of p with some relation to d cannot satisfy minimum contacts + + - Simply being the center of gravity of a suit (majority of parties reside there) does not give a state jurisdiction over all parties + + - _Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cali._ (1978, sup ct): Simply causing an effect in a state does not give j + + - Long-arm statutes + + - _Gray v. Amer. Radiator_ (1961, Ill.), specific j + + - Corporations enjoy benefits of state through consumers in that state + + - Corporations can reasonably infer that their products enjoy “substantial use and consumption” in a state + + - Look at the long arm statute before checking other j + + - _Shaffer v. Heitner_ (1977—U.S., Marshall) + + - Seizure of property under statute violates dpc + + - _In personam_ vs _in rem_ are meaningless, both ways to assert jurisdiction over a person, intl shoe always applies + + - “Stream of commerce plus” (stream of commerce and purposeful availment) + + - _J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro_ (2011, sup ct, Kennedy) + + - Purposeful availment involves an intent to submit to a sovereign authority + + - foreseeability and fairness arguments (both Brennan’s) have no place in determining j + + - _Goodyear Dunlop v. Brown_ (2011, Ginsburg) + + - different types of contacts support either general or specific j + + - Stream of commerce can only support specific j + + - _Daimler Ag v. Bauman_ (2014, Ginsburg) + + - Contacts of child corp are only attributable to parent if child is so under control of parent that it is parent’s alter ego + + - Agency theory is way too broad + + - International relations issue if foreign company is liable in us + + - Affiliating circumstances (reasonableness test) + + - _World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson_ (1980—U.S., White) + + - Such fortuitous circumstances of a car from a NY dealership getting wrecked in OK that it’s not minimum contacts + + - Unilateral activity of p taking the car to OK while moving + + - Protecting d from having the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum (reasonability of the litigation) + + - No j + + - _Asahi Metals v. Superior Court of California_ (1987, sup ct, O’Connor) + + - Horribly fractured + + - No purposeful availment (part II-A) + + - Reasonableness test fails (II-B) + + - No min contacts, no jurisdiction (III) + + - need to purposefully direct the product towards the forum state by designing it in that state, advertising in that state, marketing through a distributor who will represent the company in that state, etc. Knowledge that product will make its way into the state is not enough + + - Reasonable foreseeability + + - _Keeton v. Hustler Magazine_ (1984—U.S., Rehnquist) + + - Status of P is irrelevant when determining jurisdiction over D + + - Can reasonably expect to be haled into court in a state where your magazines are sold + + - Contacts are systematic and continuous, sufficient enough to award damages for all 50 states of circulation even in nh ct + + - Valid j + + - Intentional torts + + - _Calder v. Jones_ (1984—U.S., Rehnquist) + + - Pets directed intentional actions at Cali resident which would have significant effect on her + + - Could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here, where the bulk of the magazines they edited and wrote articles for were sold + + - Minimum contacts of the pets’ company with the state are irrelevant, pets established contacts with their intentional actions + + - Applicable law has no bearing on jurisdiction (screw you first amendment defense) + + - Valid J + + - _Walden v. Fiore_ (2014—U.S., Thomas) + + - D’s actions must be what connected d to the forum state + + - P is only link between d and nevada, and tort harm did not occur in Nevada either + + - The resident of Nevada being injured is not a sufficient contact + + - No J + + - Causing an effect on a resident of the state (_Calder-_type case allows this because d’s actions were what connected them to the forum; _Walden_-type rejects this because they weren’t) + + - “Contract plus” + + - _Burger King v. Rudzewicz_ (1985, sup ct, brennan): foreseeable that franchisee could be haled into court in franchisor’s state and the contract between had a choice-of-law provision, specific J + + - Forum selection clauses (general jurisdiction) + + - P: _The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore_ (1972): forum selection clauses are prima facie valid unless shown by party seeking its nullification to be unreasonable under the circumstances + + - _Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute_ (1991, Blackmun) + + - Clauses need not be negotiated to be valid + + - Clauses like this remove confusion and protect the cruise line’s interests + + - Related Procedure + + - RCP 4(k)(1)(A): federal court applies state law + + - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) + + - Motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction + + - RCP 13 + + - Cross claims + + - RCP 20: joinder + + - Voluntary dismissal? + + - RCP 56 (summary judgement) + + - Improper Venue, 12(b)(3) + + - 28 usc 1391: suit can be brought in any district where any d resides, substantial part of events that caused the claim occurred, or substantial part of property that is the subject is situated. If none of the above apply, any district where there’s personal jurisdiction over a d. Residency is (US citizen or permanent resident: district of domicile; entity which can be sued: all districts with personal jurisdiction if d or ppob district if p; non-US d: any fed district). The rest is venue in specific cases + + - 28 usc 1404: procedure around transferring actions to different districts or divisions within districts. + + - 28 usc 1406: improper district/division could either cause dismissal or transfer to proper venue. **If there isn’t a timely+sufficient objection to venue, venue is good** + + - _Bates v. C & S Adjusters_ (1992, 2nd cir) + + - don’t need to determine the best venue (that was what happened historically), just any which conforms to 1391 + + - Look at legislative intent in determining where the events that give rise to the claim occur. If certain acts not happening would mean no claim, then that’s a substantial part + + - _Atlantic Marine Construction v. W.D. Tex._ (2013, Alito) + + - Enforceable forum selection clauses are enforced under 1404(a) (transferred), discarding private interest factors + + - Improper venue is a matter of federal law, irrespective of contracts + + - “_Forum non conveniens_ is a doctrine allowing dismissal of a case where an alternative forum exists that would better serve the convenience of the parties (private interest) and the public in general (public interest).” + + - _Piper Aircraft v. Reyno_ (1981, Marshall) + + - Whether the law of the alternative forum is more/less favorable to p is irrelevant + + - P: _Gulf Oil v. Gilbert:_ 1404(a) is a balancing test with private and public interest factors + + - Factors: + + - Private interest + + - Ease of access to evidence + + - Availability/cost of compulsory process for the unwilling + + - Ability to actually go and look at the forum + + - All other problems relating to convenience + + - Public interest + + - Unfairness of burdening jurors with law foreign to the forum + + - Local interest in having suit decided at its home + + - Interest in having diversity cases tried at home with the law of the forum + + - Avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws/application of foreign law + + - Court congestion + + - Failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, 12(b)(6) + + - Pleading section + + - Failure to join a party under rule 19, 12(b)(7) + + - Joinder section + + +## Pleading + +- “Pleading should not be a battle of wits.” + + - _Dioguardi v. Durning_ (1957, 2nd cir): the rcp were created so that plaintiffs wouldn’t be thrown out of court for most mistakes in pleadings + + - _Conley v. Gibson_ (1957, Black): Overruled: can only dismiss 12(b)(6) if p has alleged no set of facts that would entitle to recover, only needs a short and plain statement of general facts which could prove a violation of some duty (aka ‘notice pleading’) + + - _Bell Atlantic v. Twombly_ (2007, Souter): can dismiss 12(b)(6) if the claim in the pleadings is not plausible on its face, must have enough factual heft to nudge complaint over the line from possible to **plausible** + + - _Ashcroft v. Iqbal_ (2009, Kennedy): there is no “flexible” standard, plausible is plausible, _Twombly_ applies to everything not just antitrust + +- “Responsive pleadings must be clear in what is denied and what is claimed.” + + - _PAE Gov’t v. MPRI_ (2007, 9th cir): contradicting earlier pleadings is allowed in amended complaints, if you dismiss on grounds of contradiction you’re looking at the merits of the claim during the pleading and that’s disallowed + + - _Garcia v. Hilton Hotels_ (1951, Puerto Rico fed district) + + - If it could reasonably be conceived at trial that the claim is true, sufficiently pleaded + + - Conditional privilege does not evidence failure to state a claim like absolute privilege does + + - _Rubert-Torres v. Hospital San Pablo_ (2000, 1st cir): Not every attachment to 12(c) warrants conversion under 12(d), but attaching papers that argue the merits of the motion with evidence outside the pleadings warrants conversion + + - _Zielinski v. PPI_ (1956): answers must make clear to p what is being presented, and if the answers mislead p as to who the correct defendant is, equitable estoppel may permit the claims as a punishment. + + - NOTE ON DEFENSES: if p can determine what d is referring to in p’s claims when d asserting defenses, they’re good even if conclusory (logical ambit test) + +- “Amending pleadings can prevent dismissal.” + + - Important dichotomy + + - If you object to a variance, p can seek leave to amend + + - If you do not object to a variance, p can move at the end of trial to amend under 15(b)(2) and add claims better supported by the evidence presented to the pleading + + - Reconcile: still better to object so you can defend against the claims + + - _Krupski v. Costa Crociere_ (2010, Sotomayor) + + - Know-or-should-have-known refers to d, not p (p can still make mistake with knowledge) + + - Undue delays (dilatory conduct) don’t determine mistake for relation-back doctrine + +- “Failure to comply with what is expected of a pleading can subject the parties, the lawyers, or their law firms to sanctions.” + + - 28 usc 1927: unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings can cause monetary sanctions for costs and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred due to the conduct + + - _Roth v. Green_ (2006, 10th cir): Must comply w rule 11 TO THE LETTER for sanctions to be proper, 1927 sanctions are relaxed + + - P: _Vanderhoff v. Pacheko_: 927 is for intentional wrong, 11 is for negligence + +- “Counterclaims need not establish an independent basis for jurisdiction.” + + - If you don’t bring compulsory counterclaims when required, barred _res judicata_ + + - _Jones v. FoMo Credit Co._ (2004): Compulsory counterclaims are ancillary (rule 13 transaction or occurrence test of compulsivity for j, if it’s a good counterclaim it has good jurisdiction), permissive counterclaims may be supplemental (section 1367 one case test for jurisdiction so long as no discretionary dismissal factors are acted on) + + - P: _Moore v. N.Y. Cotton_ (1926, sup ct): “arising-out-of” is a logical relation test + + - More subjectively, same witnesses and evidence? Hear the claims together for efficiency + + - _LASA v. Alexander_ (1969, 6th cir) + + - the “transaction” is not a literal transaction/contract, is the situation as a whole + + - Any crossclaim or 3pc that passes the logical-relation arising-out-of test is ancillary + +- “Joinder of parties is a rule of equity.” + + - _Bank of Cali v. Super. Ct of San Fran_ (1940, cali sup ct) + + - Joinder can be outweighed by fairness/convenience/practicability + + - 19(b) effectively: are the nonjoined person’s interests separable from the parties’? + + - From _Giampietro v. Viator_: + + - Check necessary under 19(a), and if not, deny motion. + + - Check if joinder of necessary party would defeat subject-matter jurisdiction. If not, deny motion. + + - Check whether indispensable under 19(b). If not, deny motion. If so, grant motion. + + - _Provident Tradesmens Bank v. Patterson_ (1968, Harlan) + + - Four ACTUAL interests of 19(b): + + - P’s interest in having a forum, whether alternative exists + + - D’s interest in avoiding multiple litigation/inconsistent relief/sole responsibility for shared liability + + - Interest of outsider + + - Interest of the courts and public in complete+consistent+efficient resolution + + - The decision to proceed without the party is the decision they are necessary + + - Related procedure + + - RCP 19: persons required to be joined if feasible + +- “Intervention requires meeting a minimal standard.” + + - _Grutter v. Bollinger_ (1999, 6th cir) + + - Intervention of right elements: timely motion, interest, impairment, adequacy + + - such a low standard for meeting each + + - Permissive intervention elements: timely motion, common question of law or fact, consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice adjudication + +- Related procedure + + - RCP 7: types of pleadings and their required filings + + - RCP 7.1: how to file pleadings + + - RCP 8: what each type of pleading and motions must contain + + - RCP 9: Pleading special matters + + - RCP 11: **sanctions** + + - RCP 12 + + - (a): time to serve responsives + + - (c): motion for judgement on the pleadings + + - (d): conversion of 12(b)(6) or 12(c) to summary judgement motion + + - (e): more definite statement of pleadings + + - (f) strike insufficient defense or redundant/immaterial/impertinent/scandalous matters from pleading + + - RCP 13: counterclaim and crossclaim + + - RCP 14: impleader + + - RCP 15: amending pleadings + + +## Discovery + +- “Typically, the Constitution does not affect discovery requests.” + + - Balance the movant’s need for the info and inability to get it by other means v the nonmovant’s interest in that info remaining undisclosed + + - _Schlagenhauf v. Holder_ (1964, Goldberg) + + - Discovery requests cannot be struck for 1st amdmt reasons + + - Orders must only be as broad as necessary + + - _Seattle Times v. Rhinehart_ (1984, Powell): No protective order without ensuring that it furthers an important or substantial interest unrelated to suppressing expression, and that limitation of 1st amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary to promote that interest + + - P: _The Boyd Grp. v. D’Orazio_: “generalized, unsubstantiated, speculative fear” is not good cause for a discovery order + +- “Privileged materials are exempt from discovery.” + + - _Hickman v. Taylor_ (1947, Murphy): prepared in advance of litigation (ordinary)? Must show substantial need and inability to obtain from other sources. Reflects the mental impressions of the attorney (opinion)? Never disclose. + + - Policy: attorneys make bad witnesses, should be able to create their case in a zone of privacy, should not be able to live off borrowed wits + + - _Upjohn v. U.S._ (1981, Rehnquist) + + - attorney-client privilege is a case-by-case privilege that encourages both lawyers to give professional advice to their clients, and clients to give good information to their lawyers to make good advice + + - Corporate communications are privileged if: + + - Doc/comm was provided by agents of corporate client to counsel in counsel’s capacity at direction of agents’ superiors + + - Information necessary for obtaining legal advice + + - Agents were aware that communication was for obtaining legal advice + + - Communication treated as confidential + + - Exceptions to atty-client privilege: + + - Facts + + - Crime/fraud + + - Voluntary disclosures by client to non-attorneys or non-clients + + - Exceptions to work-product immunity: + + - Facts + + - Crime/fraud + + - Voluntary disclosures by attorney + + - Ordinary course of business exception (anything not in anticipation of litigation) + + - A party’s statement + +- Related procedure + + - RCP 26: discovery + + - RCP 30: oral depo + + - RCP 33: interrogatories + + - RCP 34: production of documents + + - RCP 35: physical and mental exams + + - RCP 37: discovery sanctions + + +## Judgment as a Matter of Law + +- For all of these, resolve all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor + +- “Summary judgment is not a procedural shortcut, but a rule of judicial efficiency that prevents a wasteful or pointless trial.” + + - _Lundeen v. Cordner_ (1966, 8th cir): if trial would not give an opportunity for counsel to examine/cross-examine a key witness, what’s the point? No facts could be contested. + + - _Cross v. US_ (1964, 2d cir) + + - what will conform to a statute/precedent is a fact issue + + - Even though counsel did not cross-examine witness in depo, could still cross-examine at trial + + - Credibility of a witness is a fact issue + + - P: _Adickes_ _v. Kress_ (1970): party opposing sumju has burden of responding only after movant meets burden to come forward with proof of no genuine fact issue + + - The Celotex Trilogy + + - _Celotex Corp v. Catrett_ (1986, Rehnquist): + + - Rehnquist: when nonmovant bears burden of proof, the summary judgment motion can rely solely on the pleadings (nobody does this though) + + - Brennan: if nonmovant has burden of proof, all movant has to do is negate or show that nonmovant had insufficient evidence. If movant has burden, will need to show specific facts that prove the case. + + - N: _Anderson v. Liberty Lobby_ (1986): if claim has higher standard of proof like libel, higher sumju standard + + - N: _Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Zenith Radio Corp._ (1986): in antitrust, granting sumju used to be absurd (thousands of documents, must be a fact issue somewhere), now it follows _Anderson_ + + - _Scott v. Harris_ (2007, Scalia): if there is such overpowering evidence for an element that no reasonable jury could find otherwise, can grant sumju + +- “If no reasonable jury could find for a party after their case has been fully heard, the court may grant a motion for directed verdict against their claim.” + + - MUST FILE THIS if you want JNOV + + - _Galloway v. US_ (1943, Rutledge): an inference directly on whether the burden of proof has been met is not a reasonable inference for the purposes of a directed verdict + +- “JNOV has certain alternatives that are not as potent as a reversal of the judgment.” + + - _Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction_ (1967, White): Rule 50 does allow reversal on appeal from a jnov by its plain language and interpretation + + - When losing party moves for JNOV or alternatively new trial and both are denied, winning party should preserve right to assert that the proper remedy in the event of error is a new trial + +# Statutes / Rules +{ *Summaries for quick reference, go read the actual text yourself -ed.* } + +## Statutes + +- 28 usc 1331 (federal-question jurisdiction): original jurisdiction over all disputes arising under **the Constitution, laws, or treaties** of the US + +- 28 usc 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) + + - (a): original jurisdiction when **amount in controversy exceeds $75,000** and citizens of different states, citizen of state and foreign state, or foreign state and citizen + + - Note: value of underlying object determines AIC, maybe what p gains or d loses + + - (b): + + + - (c): for purposes of 1331 and 1441, + + - (1): Corporation is citizen of every state where it’s incorporated and every state where it has its ppob, + + + - (2): **legal representative** of decedent, minor, or incompetent is citizen of state of that person + +- 28 usc 1359: collusive joinder, district ct has no jurisdiction over action where party was joined solely to give j + +- 28 usc 1367 supj + + - (a): in action with oj, supj over all claims that are **so related to claims within oj that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III** (pendent claim), including joinder and intervention (pendent party) + + - (b): in an action with only diversity jurisdiction, no supj if such supj would defeat diversity + + - (c): may decline to exercise supj if (1) novel or complex issue of state law, (2) sup claim **substantially predominates** oj claims, (3) dismissed all claims with oj, or (4) in exceptional circumstances **other compelling reasons** + + - (d): /, sol tolls while sup claim is pending and for 30 days after sup claim’s dismissal unless state law says it’s longer + + - (e): in 1367, “state” includes DC and territories + +- 28 usc 1391 venue generally + + - (a) + + - (1): venue of all civil actions brought in fed district ct + + - (2): venue determined regardless of whether action is local or transitory + + - (b) + + - (1): suit can be brought in judicial district where any d resides + + - (2): suit can be brought in judicial district where **substantial part of events or omissions that caused the claim occurred**, or substantial part of the property that is the subject is situated + + - (3): if neither of the above provide any districts, any judicial district where a defendant is subject to personal j + + - (c) for venue, + + - (1): US resident (natural born or admitted for permanent residence) is resident of the district where they are domiciled + + - (2): entity which can sue or be sued, incorporated or not, if d is resident of all districts where courts have personal j; if p is resident of district where ppob is + + - (3): non-US d can be sued in any fed district, disregard them when determining venue/diversity of other ds + + - (d): state which has more than one district w corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in that state, resident of all districts of that state where it has personal jurisdiction in the district as if the districts were separate states + + - (e) US-related venue + + - (1): actions against officers/employees of US can be brought in any district where d resides, substantial part of harm occurred/substantial part of property, or where p resides if no real property is involved. Additional parties can be joined in accordance with RCP and normal venue requirements + + - (2): service by RCP, except delivery of summons can be made by certified mail beyond territorial limits of district of action + + - (f): civil action vs foreign state can be brought + + - (1): in any district where substantial part occurred, or substantial part of property + + - (2): /, any district where vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated as long as brought under 1605(b) + + - (3): any district where agency is licensed to do business or is doing business, if brought against agency/instrumentality of a foreign state as defined by 1603(b) + + - (4): in US Dist. Ct. for DC if brought against a foreign state or political subdivision + + - (g): civil actions which use supj can be brought in any district which any d resides in or where substantial part of accident took place + +- 28 usc 1404 venue transfer + + - (a): can transfer actions **for the convenience of the parties** to any other district where it could have been brought or any district where all parties consent or **in the interest of justice** + + - (b): upon motion/consent/stipulation of parties, any proceeding can be transferred to other divisions in the same district, / proceedings in rem brought by US can be transferred wo consent of US + + - (c): district ct can order action to be tried in any place within the division it’s pending in + + - (d): transfers to Guam/Mariana Islands/Virgin Islands are not allowed, all other parts of 1404 apply to those districts + +- 28 usc 1406 venue misc + + - (a): improper district/division either warrants dismissal or transfer to proper venue + + - (b): If no timely+sufficient objection to venue, venue is good (not like subject-matter jurisdiction) + + - (c): this section includes Guam/Mariana Islands/Virgin Islands + +- 28 usc 1441 removal generally + + - (a): Can remove any civil action where fed district ct has original j, exceptions presented by Congress + + - (b) + + - (1): fictitiously named ds are disregarded + + - (2): Cannot be removed under diversity jurisdiction if ANY defendant is citizen of state where action is brought + + - (c) severance rule + + - (1): if a suit includes + + - (A): a claim from constitution, laws, or treaties, and + + - (B): a claim either nonremovable by statute or not within original or supplemental j, entire action can be removed if it was removable without the claim outside of j + + - (2): when action matching (1) is removed, sever (1)(B) claims from federal suit and remand. Only the ds under (1)(A) need to be joined to fed suit or consent to removal + + - (d): any civil action against foreign entity may be removed and bench tried + + - (e) **actual removal** + + - (1): notwithstanding (b), can remove if + + - (A): action could have been brought in fed ct + + - (B): d party to an action which could have been brought in whole or part in fed ct and arises from the same accident as the state ct action (pendent j?) + + - (2): when removed, remand for damages hearing unless for convenience and justice should stay + + - (3): 60 days to appeal the decision before the (e)(2) remand before it goes into effect + + - (4): (e)(2) remand decision is unappealable + + - (5): + + + - (6): (e) does not restrict dismissal for inconvenient forum + + - (f): May still be able to hear removed claims even if state ct did not have jurisdiction to hear them + +- 28 usc 1442: Can remove actions against US or US agents + +- 28 usc 1443: Can remove actions for civil rights + +- 28 usc 1445: railroads, common carriers, workers’ comp, and domestic violence not removable + +- 28 usc 1446 removal procedure + + - (a): d seeking removal files subject to RCP 11 + + - (b) + + - (1): Must remove within 30 days of receiving the initial pleading (service) + + - (2) + + - (A): When removed under 1441(a) alone, all ds must consent to removal + + - (B): each D has 30 days to file removal + + - (C): later-served d filing removal can allow earlier-served ds to consent even if more than 30 days have passed + + - (3): if initial pleading is unremovable, can remove within 30 days of receiving amended pleading + + - (c) + + - (1): case cannot be (b)(3) removed by diversity more than a year after action commences unless p acted in bad faith to prevent removal + + - (2): amount in controversy is the damages in the initial pleading, unless + + - (A): pleading seeks nonmonetary relief or state either forbids specifying damages or permits more recovery than asked for, in either case amount in controversy is specified by notice of removal, in which case + + - (B): Removal under diversity is proper if district ct finds the AiC exceeds diversity AiC from 1332(a) + + - (3) + + - (A): if case is not removable solely because AiC, info about AiC is treated as “other paper” under (b)(3) + + - (B): If notice of removal is >1y after commencement and court finds p failed to disclose AiC, bad faith under (c)(1) + + - (d): Promptly after filing notice of removal w fed ct, must give written notice to adverse parties and state ct clerk + + - (e): /, Tariff Act counterclaims are removed like original complaints, no filing fee for them, and they’re dated at the original complaint before the ITC + + - (g): Civil action removable under 1442(a) meets 30-day requirement of (b) if person who wishes to remove files within 30 days of receiving notice of that 1442(a) claim + +- 28 usc 1447 general procedure after removal + + - (a): fed district can issue all necessary orders/process to bring removed case before the court + + - (b): may require removing party to file with the fed district clerk all records and proceedings, or cause those filings by writ of certiorari to state ct + + - (c): motions to remand cases for other than lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be brought within 30 days, if at any time it appears lack subject-matter jurisdiction case shall be remanded. May require costs! + + - (d): remand order is not reviewable, unless government or civil rights + + - (e): if after removal p seeks to join ds with no subject-matter jurisdiction, can deny joinder or permit+remand + +- 28 usc 1448: /, In all cases removed where one or more ds has not been served, or service was defective, new service can be completed in same manner as cases originally filed in fed district ct + +- 28 usc 1927: statutory sanctions lawyers that multiply proceedings **unreasonably and vexatiously** are subject to monetary sanctions +## FRCP + +{ + - *+: omitted because not likely to come up on my specific exam + - */: was not discussed in class but added because it feels important* +- *Left out: 5 (service), 22 (interpleader), 9 (special matters), 23 (class action), 27/28 (depo in part), 31 (written depo), 38-39 (jury trial), 40-44 (trial stuff), 45 (subpoena), 46 (objection), 47-49 (jurors, verdict), 51 (error), 52 (partial findings), 53 (master), 54 (judgment), 55 (default), 57 (declaratory), 58 (entering judgment), 60 (relief from judgment), 61 (harmless error), 62 (stay), 63 (judge’s inability to proceed), 64 (seizure), 65 (injunctions), 66 (receivers), 67 (deposit into ct), 68 (offer of judgment), 69 (execution), 70-71 (enforcement), 72-73 (magistrate judges), 77-80 (district cts)* + - { *-ed* } +} + +- 4 + + - (k) territorial limits of effective service + + - (1) + + - (A): Serving summons establishes pj over d who is subject to jurisdiction of a ct of general jurisdiction in state where ct is located + + - (B): is a 14/19 party joined and served within US judicial district not more than 100 mi from where service was issued, or + + - (C): when authorized by statute + + - (2): /, serving summons for claim arising-under federal law establishes pj if d not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s cts of general jurisdiction and jurisdiction is consistent w us const and laws + + - (m): d must be served within 90 days of filing or ct will dismiss wo prejudice, unless p **shows good cause for failure**, in which case ct will extend for an appropriate period + +- 5 + +- 6 is all /-ish + + - (a) + + - (1) Days: exclude day of event, count all days and include last day, but if ends on weekend/legal holiday, extends to end of next business day + + - (2) Hours: immediately on occurrence clock starts, every hour, but if ends on weekend/legal holiday it extends to same time on next business day + + - (3): /, clerk’s office inaccessible during last day/hour? First accessible day/day at the same time that is a business day + + - (4): unless defined locally, last day ends at midnight for e-filing or office close otherwise + + - (5): ///, next day is forwards after event or backwards before event + + - (6): legal holiday is new years, mlk, Washington, memorial, independence, labor, columbus, vets, thanksgiving, Christmas, any day declared by president/congress, or for periods after an event, state holidays + +- 7 pleadings allowed + + - (a): complaint, answer, reply + + - (b) + + +- 8 general rules of pleading + + - (a): **short and plain statements** of jurisdiction and claim + + - (b) + + - (1): responses to pleadings are short and plain statements of defenses, plus admissions and denials + + - (2): denials must /**fairly respond to the substance** of the allegation + + - (3): may generally deny entire pleading, or deny some allegations and admit others + + - (4): can deny an allegation in part and admit in part in good faith + + - (5): can **lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation**, effectively denial + + - (6): in required responsive pleading, admitted if not expressly denied. In other responsive pleading, denied if not expressly denied. + + - (c): must state any avoidances or affirmative defenses in responsive pleading, and any mistakenly designated parts of pleadings must be treated as correctly designated + + - (d): **simple, concise, and direct** allegations, no technical form required; may set out multiple alternative claims/defenses even if inconsistent + + - (e): **pleadings must be construed as to do justice.** + +- 10: form of pleadings, must have caption with court name, title, file number, 7(a) designation. Title must name all parties. Pleading must state claims/defenses in numbered paragraphs, limited as far as practicable to single set of circumstances. + + +- 11 signing papers and sanctions + + - (a): everything filed w ct must contain at least one attorney or if _pro se_, the party. Must also have signer’s address, email, phone number. Pleadings need not be verified. + + - (b): you represent everything filed with the ct to the best of your knowledge: + + - (1): is not presented to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase cost + + - (2): claims/defenses are warranted by existing law or a **nonfrivolous argument** for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or establishing new law + + - (3): factual contentions will have evidentiary support or (if specifically identified) will likely have evidentiary support after discovery + + - (4): denials are warranted or reasonably based on belief or lack of information + + - (c): sanctions + + - (1): if ct determines 11(b) violated after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, ct can sanction attorney/firm/party + + - (2): motion for sanctions must be served on party but not filed if corrected within 21 days + + - (3): ct can order explanation of why they have not violated 11(b) + + - (4): sanctions are limited to what will **deter repetition**, including money and non-monetary directives + + - (5): ct cannot impose monetary sanction for 11(b)(2) violation or at all on its own unless it issued (c)(3) order before voluntary dismissal or settlement + + - (6): /, order must describe sanctioned conduct and explain basis for sanction + + - (d): 11 does not apply to discovery + +- 12 + + - (a) time to serve responsive pleadings + + - (b) defenses by motion + + - (1) subject-matter jurisdiction + + - (2) pj + + - (3) venue + + - (6) failure claim + + - (7) failure join + + - (c): judgment on pleadings, **after pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay proceedings** + + - (d): if matters outside pleadings presented in 12(b)(6) or 12(c), converted to 56 + + - (e): more definite statement, **before filing responsive pleading** + + - (f): strike, **before filing response or if response not allowed, 21 days after its service** + + - (g): must consolidate your motions, use em or lose em + + - (h): motions are use em or lose em except 2, 6, 7 + + - + + +- 13 counterclaim and crossclaim + + - (a): pleading must state counterclaims that **arise out of same transaction or occurrence** (as claims in case-in-chief) and do not require adding another party with no j + + - Standard for arising-out-of: logical relation, _Jones v. FoMoCreditCo_ + + - (b): counterclaims that are not compulsory are permissive, and may be brought + + - (c) + + + - (d) + + + - (e): /, court may allow party to file supplemental pleading adding counterclaim that was not available at time of service of earlier pleading + + - (g): may assert crossclaim that **arises-out-of** (case-in-chief or a counterclaim) against coparty, whole or partial indemnity is a crossclaim + + - (h): 19 and 20 govern addition of parties to counterclaims and crossclaims + + - (jurisdiction) + + +- 14 impleader + + - (a) + + - (1): 3p may implead within 14 days of serving an answer, or with court’s leave after that + + - (2): 3d must assert 12 defenses, any counterclaim against 3p; may assert any counterclaim against p, defense against p’s claims, any claim **arising-out-of** (p v d claim) + + - (3): p may assert **arising-out-of** (p v d claim) against 3d, then 3d must assert 12 and comcounterclaims; may assert percounterclaims/crossclaims + + - (4): /, any party can move to strike, sever, or try separately a 3pc + + - (5): 3d can implead new 3ds + + - (b): p may implead when claim asserted against them if d could do so + + - (c) + + +- 15 amendments + + - (a): can amend once **as a matter of course** within 21 days after serving or if pleading requires a responsive pleading then 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a 12(b) (e) or (f) motion, whichever is earlier + + - (b) + + - (1): variance objection court may permit amendment, should do so freely when no prejudice of the action/defense is shown + + - (2): /, issue tried not in pleadings with express consent must be treated if raised in pleadings, may move to amend pleadings to conform to consent-tried issues but even if not amended will not affect result + + - (c) + + - (1): amdmt **relates back** when statute of limitations allows, amdmt asserts claim or defense that **arose-out-of** (original pleading), or amdmt changes party if (**arose-out-of** and within 4(m) period the party had notice of the action sufficient to defeat allegations of prejudice if forced to defend and knew/should have known action would be brought against it but for mistake of d’s identity + + - (2) + + +- 17: real party in interest rule, + + +- 18: party asserting claims may join independent or alternative claims, even if one is contingent on disposition of another. “in particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to set aside a claim that is fraudulent…without first obtaining a judgment for that money” + +- 19 compulsory joinder of parties + + - (a) + + - (1): if subject to service and joinder would be feasible (not deprive ct of subject-matter jurisdiction), must be joined if: + + - (A): in absence of that person, ct cannot fully grant relief, or + + - (B): person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and disposing of the action in their absence may impair or impede their ability to protect that interest or leave existing party at risk of multiple inconsistent obligations + + - (2): ct must order joinder of required parties, / refusal to join as a p can warrant joinder as a d or involuntary p + + - (3): if joined party objects to venue and their joinder would mean improper venue, party must be dismissed + + - (b): if joinder is infeasible, must determine **in equity and good conscience** if case can proceed, factors include + + - Absent party’s interest and current parties’ interests + + - Extent to which prejudice on interests could be avoided by protective provisions, shaped relief, or other measures, whether judgment rendered in absence would be adequate, and whether p would have adequate remedy if dismissed for nonjoinder + + - (c): must state in claim any person’s name if known who is required but not joined, and why they were not joined + + - (d) + + +- 20 permissive joinder of parties + + - (a) + + - (1) may join as ps if any joint, several, or alternative right to relief **arising-out-of** and any question of law or fact common to all ps will arise + + - (2) may join as ds if any right to relief is asserted against them (joint/several/alternative) **arising-out-of** and any question of law or fact common to all ds will arise + + - (3): neither p nor d need to be interested in the entire relief + + - (b): court can use protective measures like separate trials to prevent **embarrassment, delay, expense, or prejudice** to prevent prejudice from including persons in a trial who have no claim against each other + +- 24 intervention + + - (a): **intervention of right** when timely motion, unconditional right to intervene by statute or interest relating to property/transaction that is the subject of the action, and adjudication without them **may** **impair or impede** the intervenor’s ability to protect its interest unless existing parties adequately represent that interest + + - Standards: interest de novo, impairment de novo, adequacy de novo, timeliness abuse-of-discretion (_Grutter_) + + - (b): permissive intervention when timely motion, conditional right/common question of law or fact/+. Also consider whether intervention **will unduly delay** **or prejudice** adjudication of parties’ rights + + - (c): motion to intervene must be served on parties as provided in rule 5, state grounds for intervention and accompany pleading with claim or defense for intervention + +- 26 general discovery + + - (a) required disclosures + + - (1) initial disclosure + + - (A): Except as exempted by 26(a)(1)(B), party must provide to other parties without waiting for a discovery request: + + - Name and (if known) address+ phone number of each individual **likely to have discoverable information**, also subjects of that information, which the disclosing party may use to support its claims and defenses unless used solely for impeachment + + - Copy or description (category and location) of all documents/electronic info/tangible things that are in their **possession, custody, or control** that may be used to support claims/defenses unless for impeachment + + - Computation of each category of damages, plus under rule 34 the materials used for that computation unless privileged or protected from disclosure, including mats about nature and extent of injuries suffered + + - For inspection and copying under rule 34, any insurance agreement which may have a party liable partially for the action to indemnify you or reimburse you for payments made + + - (B): These are exempt from an initial disclosure: + + - Actions for review on admin records + + - Forfeiture actions in rem from federal statute + + - Petitions for habeas corpus or other criminal challenges + + - _Pro se_ by people in custody of the government + + - Actions to enforce or quash admin subpoena + + - Actions by US to recover benefit payments + + - Actions by US for student loan collection + + - Proceedings ancillary to other proceedings + + - Enforcement of arbitration awards + + - (C): must make disclosures at or within 14 days after 26(f) conference unless time is set by stipulation, court order, objection at conference saying initial disclosures are not appropriate (which is stated in discovery plan) in which case ct will rule on what disclosures are appropriate + + - (D): party first served/joined after 26(f) conference must make within 30 days of joinder/service, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered + + - (E): Party is not excused from disclosures because it has not fully investigated the case, challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosure, or because other party has not made its disclosures + + - (2) expert testimony + + - Must disclose identity of any witness under fre 702/03/05 + + - Must also have written report prepared+signed by witness if witness is **retained or specifically employed to provide expert testimony in the case** or duties as an employee **regularly involve** giving expert testimony + + - complete statement of all opinions witness will express plus reasoning + + - data/info considered in forming those opinions + + - exhibits that will be used to summarize or support + + - qualifications, all publications authored in last 10y + + - all other cases in last 4y that expert testified at trial or by depo + + - statement of compensation paid for **study and testimony** in the case + + - If not required to provide above report, disclosure must state subject matter and summary of facts and opinions + + - These disclosures must be made at times/sequence that court orders, absent stipulation or ct order they must be made at least 90 days before date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial, or (if the evidence is intended solely to rebut evidence on the same subject matter by another party) within 30 days after another party’s disclosure + + - Must be supplemented under 26(e) when required + + - (3) pretrial disclosures + + - Must provide to other parties and **promptly file** the below except for evidence solely for impeachment: + + - Name/addy/phone of each witness, whether they expect to present them or if they may call them if the need arises + + - Designation of whether they are testifying by deposition, and if so a transcript of the pertinent parts of the depo + + - Identification of each exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, and whether party expects to offer them or may offer if need arises + + - Must be made at least 30 days before trial, and within 14 days after they are made (unless ct sets different time) party can serve+**promptly file** list of objections under 32(a) about depositions under the above list and admissibility of the exhibits. Objections not made are waived unless excused by ct for good cause, except for those about admissibility under prejudice/law/constitution/rules (fre 402/403) + + - (4): disclosures must be in writing, signed, and served + + - (b) scope of discovery + + - (1): unless otherwise limited, parties can get discovery for any **nonprivileged matter relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case**. Consider **importance of issues at stake, amount in controversy, relative access to relevant information, parties’ resources, importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether burden of expense outweighs its likely benefit**. Need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable + + - (2) + + - (A): ct can alter limits on number of depos/interrogatories or length of depos under rule 30, or number of requests under rule 36 + + - (B): need not provide discovery of electronic info that is not reasonably accessible because of **burden or cost**, on motion to compel discovery must show the **information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,** and even if showing is made ct can order discovery compelled for **good cause** from requesting party under ct-specified conditions + + - (C): ct must limit frequency or extent allowed by local rules or rcp if **unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,** can be obtained from **less burdensome, more convenient, or less expensive** source, party has had **ample opportunity to obtain the information sought by discovery**, or **outside scope provided in (b)(1)** + + - +? + + - (3) Trial prep materials (work product doctrine) + + - (A): documents/tangible things **prepared in anticipation of litigation** (ordinary) or for trial by or for a party are normally not discoverable, but can be if otherwise discoverable under 26(b)(1) and the requesting party shows **substantial need** for the materials to prepare its case and cannot **without undue hardship** obtain their **substantial equivalent** + + - (B): if ct orders discovery of these, it must protect against disclosure of **mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories** of attorneys or representatives (opinion) + + - (C): party or other person may request and obtain their own previous statement (written and signed or approved statement, or record that recites their oral statement verbatim) about the action or its subject matter, if refused can move for a ct order and 37(a)(5) applies to expenses + + - + + + - (5) claiming privilege + + - (A): party withholding otherwise discoverable info by stating that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-prep material, must expressly make that claim and describe the nature of the materials in a manner that will enable assessment of the claim without revealing the privileged/protected info + + - (B): if info subject to this type of claim is provided, can notify the parties that have it, who must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the info until claim is resolved, must take reasonable steps to retrieve the info if it was disclosed before they were notified, and may promptly present the info to the ct under seal. This producing party must preserve the info until the claim is resolved + + - +? + + - +? + + - (c) protective orders + + - (1): parties that have discovery sought against them can move for protective orders in ct where action is pending or where depo will be taken, must certify that movant conferred in good faith with other parties in an attempt to resolve without court action. The following can be issued **for good cause** to prevent **annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense**: + + - Forbidding discovery + + - Specifying terms for discovery (place, time, expenses) + + - Changing discovery method + + - Forbidding inquiry into certain matters or limiting the scope of discovery into those matters + + - Designating that certain persons must be present when discovery happens + + - Requiring depo be sealed and only opened on ct order + + - Requiring that trade secret or other confidential research/development/info not be revealed or only be revealed in specific ways + + - Requiring that parties simultaneously file docs in sealed envelopes to only be opened as ct directs + + - (2): if motion for protective order is denied in whole or part, ct can also order **on just terms** that person provide/permit discovery + + - (3): /, 37(a)(5) applies to expenses + + - + + + - (d) timing of discovery + + - (1): party may not seek discovery before 26(f) conference, except in proceedings exempt from initial disclosure or when authorized by rcp, stipulation, or ct order + + - (2) + + - More than 21 days after summons and complaint are served, requests under rule 34 may be delivered to the served party or by that party to any party that has been served + + - Requests are considered served at first 26(f) conference + + - (3): unless otherwise stipulated or ordered **for parties’ and witnesses’ convenience and in the interests of justice**, methods of discovery can be used in any sequence and discovery by one party does not require any other party to delay their discovery + + - (e) supplementing disclosures/responses + + - (1): Must supplement or correct 26(a) disclosures and responses to interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admission: + + - In a timely manner if they learn that **in some material respect** the disclosure/response is incomplete or incorrect, and additional/corrective info has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during discovery or in writing, or + + - As ordered by the court + + - (2): For experts with required reports, duty to supplement extends both to info included in report and info given during depo. Any changes/additions must be disclosed by the time pretrial disclosures are due (26(a)(3)) + + - (f) conference + + - (1): must confer **as soon as practicable** except in proceeding exempt from initial disclosure or when ct orders otherwise, and must be at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or scheduling order is due + + - (2): conference considers **nature and basis of claims and defenses** and possibility for settling or resolving the case, makes/arranges for required disclosure, discusses issues about preserving discoverable info, develops a proposed discovery plan. Attorneys of record and _pro se_ parties are jointly responsible for arranging the conference, attempting in good faith to agree on a discovery plan, and for submitting that plan to the ct within 14 days after conference. Ct may order parties/attorneys to attend conference in person + + - (3): discovery plan states parties’ views and proposals on: + + - Changes in **timing, form, or requirement** for required disclosures, incl. statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be made + + - Subjects on which discovery may be needed, when it should be completed, and whether it should be in phases or limited to/focused on particular issues + + - Issues about disclosure/discovery/preservation of electronic info, incl. form or forms in which it should be produced + + - Issues about claims of privilege or protection as trial-preparation materials, incl. (if parties agree on procedure to assert these claims after production) whether to ask ct to include their agreement in an order under fre 502 + + - What changes should be made in limitations imposed, what other limitations should be imposed + + - Any other orders ct should issue under 26(c) or 16(b)/(c) + + - (4): if necessary to comply with expedited schedule for 16(b) conferences, ct may by local rule require conference to occur less than 21 days before scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under 16(b) and require written report outlining discovery plan to be filed less than 14 days after parties’ conference or excuse parties from submitting written report and permit oral discovery plan at 16(b) conference + + - (g) signing + + - All disclosures must be signed by at least one attorney of record, or party if _pro se_, plus addy/email/phone. By signing, you certify to the best of your **knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry** that: + + - the disclosure is complete and correct as of time it is made + + - discovery requests/responses/objections are: + + - consistent with rcp and warranted by existing law or non-frivolous argument for extending/modifying/reversing/establishing law + + - not interposed for any improper purpose like harassment, unnecessary delay, needless increase of litigation cost + + - not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, considering needs of the case, prior discovery, AIC, and importance of issues at stake + + - Other parties have no duty to act on unsigned disclosure/request/response/objection until signed, and must be stricken unless signature is promptly supplied after omission is called to attorney or party’s attention + + - If certification violates this rule, ct must on motion or on its own impose an appropriate sanction on signer, party, or both, and can include reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by violation + +- 30 oral depo + + - (a) with/without leave + + - (1): Oral depos can be taken without leave except under (a)(2), and attendance can be compelled under r45 subpoena + + - (2): need leave which must be granted to extent consistent with 26(b)(1)/(2) if: + + - (A): parties have not stipulated to depo and would either result in >10 depos total, deponent has already been deposed, or seeks to take depo before 26(d) timing unless certifying in notice that deponent is expected to leave the US and would be unavailable after that time, or + + - (B): deponent is in prison + + - (b) formal requirements + + - (1): must give reasonable written notice to every other party that a party wants to depose, incl. time and place of depo, and if known deponent’s name and addy, if name not known general description that will identify person or particular class/group they belong to + + - (2): if subpoena duces tecum is to be served on deponent, materials for production as set out in subpoena may be listed in the notice or an attachment, a notice to a party deponent can also be accompanied by a 34 request for production at depo + + - (3): party noticing depo must state method for recording in the notice, including (unless ct orders otherwise) audio, audiovisual, stenography, another method designated by another party (with that party bearing the expense unless otherwise ordered) + + - (4): parties can stipulate or ct can order on motion a remote depo by telephone or other means, this depo “takes place” for 28(a)+37(a)(2)+37(b)(1) where deponent answers questions + + - (5) officer duties + + - (A): depo must be conducted before an officer appointed/designated under r28 unless stipulated otherwise, who must begin depo with on-the-record statement that includes: + + - Officer’s name+business addy + + - Date/time/place of depo + + - Deponent’s name + + - Officer’s administration of deponent’s oath + + - Identity of all person spresent + + - (B): with non-stenographic recording, officer must repeat the first 3 above at every unit of recording medium, and appearance/demeanor of attorneys and deponent must not be distorted through recording techniques + + - (C): after depo, officer must state depo is complete and set out any stipulations made by attys about custody of the transcript/recording and the exhibits, or any other pertinent matters + + - (6): may name entity as deponent and describe with reasonable particularity the matters for depo, in which case named organization designates one or more officers/directors/managing agents/other persons to testify, and sets out matters they will testify on. Subpoena must advise nonparty org of its duty to designate. Persons designated must testify about info known or reasonably available to organization, and does not preclude depo by any other procedure + + - (c) exam and cross-exam of deponent + + - (1): exam and cross-exam of deponent proceed under fre except 103 and 615, and must be recorded by designated method. Must be recorded personally by officer or by person acting in presence and under direction of officer + + - (2): objections are noted on the record but exam still proceeds, must be stated in non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. May instruct a deponent not to answer only when **necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a 30(d)(3) motion** + + - (3): noticed party may serve written questions in sealed envelope on party noticing depo instead of participating, who must deliver them to the officer who must ask those questions and record their answers + + - (d) duration/sanction/motion to terminate/limit + + - (1): depo limited to one day of 7h, must allow additional time consistent with 26(b)(1)/(2) if needed to **fairly examine** deponent or if some circumstance impedes/delays examination + + - (2): ct may impose appropriate sanctions on person who impedes/delays/frustrates fair exam + + - (3) + + - (A): may move at any time during depo to terminate/limit depo on ground that it is conducted in **bad faith** or manner that **unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses** deponent or party, may be filed in ct where action is pending or where depo is being taken. If objecting depo/party demands, depo must be suspended for time necessary to obtain that order + + - (B): ct may order termination or 26(c) scope limitation, and if terminated, may be resumed only by order of ct where action is pending + + - (C): 37(a)(5) applies here + + - (e) review by witness + + - (1): on request, deponent must be allowed 30 days after being notified that transcript/recording is available to review recording and sign statement listing changes+reasons for changes + + - (2): officer must note in 30(f)(1) certificate whether review was requested and must attach those changes + + - (f) certification, delivery, exhibits, copies, filing + + - (1): officer must certify witness was duly sworn and depo accurately records testimony, must accompany the depo record, and both must be sealed in envelope/package bearing action title and marked “Deposition of [name]”, must promptly be sent to attorney who arranged for the transcript, must be stored under conditions to protect against loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration + + - (2) + + - (A): documents+tangible things produced for inspection must be marked for identification and attached to depo, any party may inspect+copy them. If person who produced them wants to keep originals: + + - May offer copies to be attached and then used as originals after giving fair opportunity to verify those copies against the originals + + - May give all parties fair opportunity to inspect and copy originals after they are marked in which case they may be used as if attached + + - (B): any party may move for order that originals be attached pending final disposition of the case + + - (3): unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, officer must retain stenographic notes or copy of other method, and when paid reasonable chares, must furnish copy to any party or deponent + + - (4): party who files depo must promptly notify all other parties of filing + + - (g): party who attends expecting depo to be taken may recover reasonable expenses for attending if noticing party failed to attend+proceed with depo or failed to serve subpoena on nonparty d who did not attend + + - + + +- 33 interrogatories + + - (a) + + - (1): unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, no more than 25 written interrogatories (including subparts). Leave to serve may be granted consistent with 26(b)(1)/(2) + + - (2): may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under 26(b), not objectionable merely because it asks for opinion that relates to fact/application, but ct may order interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery is complete or until pretrial conference or some other time + + - (b) + + - (1): must be answered by party to whom they are directed, or any officer or agent if party is a public/private org or govt agency + + - (2): must serve answers within 30 days after being served w interrogatories unless stipulated under 29 or ordered + + - (3): each interrogatory must be answered separately and fully in writing under oath if not objected to + + - (4): grounds for objecting to interrogatory must be specific, any ground not stated in timely objection is waived unless ct excuses the failure for good cause + + - (5): answers must be signed, atty must sign any objections + + - (c): answer to interrogatory may be used to the extent allowed by fre + + - (d): if answer may be determined by business records and burden of ascertaining answer will be substantially same for either party, responding party may answer by specifying records that must be reviewed in sufficient detail to enable location and identification as readily as the responding party could, and giving the interrogating party a reasonable opportunity to examine (audit, copy, compile, abstract, summarize) + + - + + +- 34 production + + - (a): party may serve request within 26(b) to: + + - (1): produce and permit requesting party or representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample within the responding party’s custody and control: + + - (A): designated documents electronically stored information by writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photos, sound recording, images, other data, stored in any medium from which information can be obtained directly or after translation by responding party into reasonably usable form + + - (B): designated tangible things + + - (2): permit entry onto designated land/property possessed and controlled by responding party to inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property/designated objects on it + + - (b) + + - (1): request must describe with reasonable particularity each item/category to be inspected, must specify reasonable time/place/manner for inspection/performance, and may specify form or forms in which electronically stored info is to be produced + + - (2) + + - (A) must respond in writing within 30 days of service of request or (if delivered under 26(d)(2)) within 30 days after first 26(f) conference, unless stipulated under r29 or ordered + + - (B): each item/category must state inspection/related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objection, may also state it will produce copies instead of inspection, which must be completed in the same time as the request or another reasonable time specified in response + + - (C): objections must state whether any materials are being withheld on basis of that objection, objections in party must specify the part and permit the rest + + - (D): responses to requests for e-info may state objections, and if objecting to a requested form, must state form it intends to use + + - (E): unless otherwise stipulated or ordered, these all apply to production of documents and e-info: + + - Party must produce documents **as they are kept in the usual course of business** or organize and label them to correspond to categories in request + + - If request does not specify form for e-info, must produce it in form which it is ordinarily maintained or in reasonably usable form + + - Need not produce the same info in more than one form + + - (c): nonparties may be compelled under r45 to produce documents/tangible things or permit inspection + + - + + +- 35 phys/mental exams + + - (a) + + - (1): ct may order party whose mental or physical condition incl. blood group is in controversy to submit physical or mental exam by suitably licensed or certified examiner, can also order party to produce a person in its custody or legal control for examination + + - (2): order may only be made on motion, **for good cause**, on notice to all parties and person to be examined; must specify time+place+manner+conditions+scope of exam as well as person who will perform it + + - (b) + + - (1): movant must on request deliver copy of examiner’s report and reports of all earlier examinations of the same condition + + - (2): report must be in writing, set out in detail the findings incl. diagnoses, conclusions, and test results + + - (3): After delivering the reports, movant may request (and is entitled to) **like reports of all earlier or later examinations of the same condition**, need not be delivered by the party if party shows it could not obtain them + + - (4): by requesting examiner’s report or deposing examiner, party examined waives any privilege concerning testimony about all exams of that same condition + + - (5): ct may order on motion on just terms that party deliver report of examination, and if not provided, ct may exclude examiner’s testimony at trial + + - (6): (b) also applies to all exams made by parties’ agreement unless agreement states otherwise, and does not preclude examiner’s report or depo under other rules + + - + + + - +? + +- 37 sanctions + + - (a) + + - (1): party can move for order compelling disclosure/discovery, certifies good faith conference or conference attempt + + - (2): must be made in ct where action is pending if party, if nonparty must be made in ct where discovery is/will be taken + + - (3): + + - (A): Motion to compel disclosure can be made if party fails under 26(a) + + - (B): Can move to compel discovery answer/designation/production/inspection if + + - Deponent fails to answer question under 30/31 + + - Corporation/entity fails to make designation 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4) + + - Party fails to answer interrogatory under 33 + + - Party fails to produce documents or respond that inspection will be permitted or permit an inspection as requested under 34 + + - (C): with oral deposition, party asking question may complete/adjourn the examination before moving + + - (4): evasive/incomplete disclosures/answers/responses are FAY-lyuhs + + - (5) + + - (A): if motion granted or made moot by requested thing being provided, court must **after giving an opportunity to be heard** require the nonmovant to pay reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion incl. attorney’s fees. Must not order this payment if motion was filed before attempting to resolve without ct action in good faith, other party’s conduct was **substantially justified**, or other circumstances make the award unjust + + - (B): if motion denied, ct may issue protective order and must require movant to pay reasonable expenses unless motion was **substantially justified** or other circumstances make the payment unjust + + - (C): if motion granted in part and denied in part, ct may issue protective orders and may (after giving opportunity to be heard) apportion costs + + - (b) failure to comply w ct order + + - (1): If ct where discovery is taken orders deponent to be sworn or to answer a question, failure may be considered contempt of court + + - (2) + + - (A): party or witness fails to obey order to provide/permit discovery? Ct can issue further **just** orders including: + + - Directing those matters established in favor of the other party + + - Prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims, or from introducing designated matters in evidence + + - Striking pleadings in whole or part + + - Staying proceedings until obeyed + + - Dismissing action in whole or part + + - Default judgment + + - Contempt of court (except for failure to submit to r35 exam) + + - (B): party fails to comply with 35(a) to produce another person? Ct may issue any of the above (except contempt) unless disobedient party shows it cannot produce the other person + + - (C): instead of or in addition to the orders above, **must** order reasonable costs unless substantially justified or other circumstances would make this unjust + + - (c) failure to disclose/supplement/admit + + - (1): party fails to provide information or identify a witness under 26(a)/(c)? not allowed to use that info/witness for evidence on motion, hearing, or trial unless substantially justified or harmless. Instead of or in addition to that sanction, the ct may (on motion and after opportunity to be heard): + + - Order payment of reasonable expenses + + - Inform jury of party’s failure + + - Impose other appropriate sanctions including 37(b)(2)(a) except contempt + + - (2): party fails to admit under 36 and requesting party proves a document to be genuine or the matter true, requesting party may move for reasonable expenses, and must be ordered unless: + + - Objectionable request under 36(a) + + - Admission was of **no substantial importance** + + - Failing party had **reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter** + + - other good reason for failure to admit + + - (d) sanctions for failure to attend own depo or interrogatory responses + + - (1) + + - (A): may impose sanctions on motion if: + + - Party or person designated under 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4) fails to appear for deposition after being served w proper notice + + - Party fails to serve answers/objections/responses to properly served interrogatories under 33 or inspection requests under 34 + + - (B): motion of this kind must certify good faith conference or attempt in effort to obtain answer/response without ct action + + - (2): failure under (1)(A) is not excused on ground that discovery was objectionable unless party failing to act has pending motion for 26(c) protective order + + - (3): sanctions for these may include (b)(2)(A) except contempt, and instead of or in addition to those ct must require failing party to pay reasonable expenses unless substantially justified or otherwise unjust + + - (e): failure to preserve electronic info? + + - (1): If prejudice to another party from loss of info, may order measures **no greater than necessary** to cure prejudice + + - (2): if party acted with intent to deprive, may: + + - Presume lost info was unfavorable, + + - Instruct jury that it may/must presume info was unfavorable, or + + - Dismiss action/default judgment + + - (f): failure to participate in good faith in developing/submitting discovery plan? After giving opportunity to be heard, ct may require party to pay reasonable expenses + +- 42 + + - (a): court can consolidate actions, join hearings, or issue any other orders to prevent unnecessary delay if multiple actions have a common question of law or fact + + - (b): court can order separate trials for issues/claims/counterclaims/etc for **convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize**, preserving jury trial + +- 50 judgment as a matter of law + + - (a) directed verdict: + + - (1): if **party has been fully heard** on issue and **reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis** to find for party on that issue, may resolve issue against that party and grant motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on claim/defense that can only be maintained/defeated with favorable finding on the issue + + - (2): motion for judgment as a matter of law can be made any time before case is submitted to jury, specify judgment sought and law/facts entitling judgment + + - (b) jnov: if not granted under (a), ct is considered to have submitted action to jury subject to later deciding of legal questions. May file renewed motion no later than 28 days after verdict entered (or if motion addresses non-verdict issue, can file no later than 28 days after jury was discharged renewed motion AND alternative/joint motion for new trial under 59), and in ruling on this motion the ct may: + + - Allow judgment on the verdict + + - Order new trial + + - Direct entry of judgment as a matter of law + + - (c) jnov 2 + + - (1): if ct grants renewed motion, must also conditionally rule on motion for new trial by determining whether new trial should be granted if judgment is later vacated/reversed, also must state grounds for conditionally granting/denying + + - (2): conditional rulings do not affect judgment’s finality + + - (d) jnov 3: motion for new trial by losing party must be filed within 28 days after entry of judgment + + - (e) jnov 4: if denies motion for judgment as a matter of law, prevailing party may assert grounds as an appellee (loser appellant) that it is entitled to new trial if appellate ct concludes error in denial. If appellate ct reverses, may order new trial, direct trial ct to determine whether new trial is proper, or direct judgment. + +- 56 summary judgment + + - (a): may move for summary judgment identifying each claim/defense/part of claim or defense they want it against, granted if **no genuine dispute as to any material fact** and **movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.** + + - (b): may file at any time until 30 days after all discovery closes (unless otherwise set by local rule or court order) + + - (c) + + - (1): any fact asserted not genuinely in dispute must be supported by + + - (A): citing to materials in the record, or + + - (B): showing materials cited to not establish the absence or presence of a dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact + + - (2): May object by saying material cited to support/dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form admissible in evidence + + - (3): court only needs to consider cited materials, but may consider other materials in the record + + - (4): affidavits/declarations used to support/oppose a motion must be made **on personal knowledge**, set out facts admissible in evidence, and show that the person making it is competent to testify on the matters stated + + - (d): if nonmovant shows it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition in an affidavit/declaration, court may: + + - Defer/deny the motion + + - Allow time to obtain the info (affs/decs/disc) + + - Issue any other appropriate order + + - (e): if failure to property support factual assertion or properly address another factual assertion, court may: + + - Give opportunity to properly support/address the fact + + - Consider the fact undisputed + + - Grant summary judgment if motion and supporting materials (including facts like this and considered undisputed) show an entitlement + + - Issue any other appropriate order + + - (f): after giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, court may: + + - Grant summary judgment for nonmovant + + - Grant motion on grounds not raised + + - Consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be in genuine dispute + + - (g): if ct does not grant all relief requested, may enter order stating material fact that is not genuinely in dispute and treating it as established + + - (h): if bad faith aff/dec, may order submitting party (after notice and reasonable time to respond) to pay reasonable expenses, may also hold offending party/atty in contempt or other sanctions + +- 59 new trial + + - (a) + + - (1): may grant motion for new trial on all/some issues after a jury trial for any reason previously granted in federal court at law, or after nonjury trial where rehearing has been granted in federal court at equity + + - (2): on motion for new trial, ct may also open the judgment, take additional testimony, amend and add findings/holdings, and direct entry of new judgment + + - (b): must file no later than 28 days after judgment entered + + - (c): when motion is based on affidavits, must be filed with motion. Opposing party has 14 days after service to file affidavits, and ct may permit reply affidavits + + - (d): ct may order new trial sua sponte no later than 28 days after entry for any reason that would justify granting a party’s motion. Ct may also grant motion on reason not in the motion if both parties have had notice and an opportunity to be heard. Order must specify reasons for new trial in either of these cases! + + - (e): motion to alter/amend judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/Resources/Outlines/home.md b/content/Resources/Outlines/home.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6f742c55b --- /dev/null +++ b/content/Resources/Outlines/home.md @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +--- +title: 🏠 Law School Outlines - Home +tags: + - toc + - legal +date: 2024-02-19 +draft: true +--- +In the interest of public access to knowledge, I will be uploading all of my outlines from law school classes I've taken to this website in downloadable file and webpage format. An outline is the condensed sum content of a legal course's casebook readings and class discussion in the format that will be most useful for either studying for an exam or for quick reference during that exam. + +Feel free to use these for your own understanding of a doctrine or as a starting point for further research. +## Caveats +These are **not legal advice**, and **not a professional opinion**; nor are they the complete picture of any area of the law. If the professor thought it was important, it was in here; thus it's not even my own complete understanding of the law. + +If you're a law student, making your own outline will make studying exponentially easier and you *will* score higher. Your professor cares about different things than mine. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/Updates/2024/feb.md b/content/Updates/2024/feb.md index 7857f2e0f..4454b6829 100644 --- a/content/Updates/2024/feb.md +++ b/content/Updates/2024/feb.md @@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ lastmod: 2024-02-28 ## Housekeeping ## Pages -- +- New RSS feed at [Updates.xml](/Updates.xml) that only changes once a month when I push updates like this one. ## Status Updates - Updated the engine, which was terrifying given how many custom tweaks I have to it. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/index.md b/content/index.md index a8a9af6d4..524270ab6 100644 --- a/content/index.md +++ b/content/index.md @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ date: 2023-08-23 On my little corner of the internet, I document my adventures in tech and complain about the internet of shit. This is **Projects & Privacy**. # Welcome! -You're on a site called a [[Misc/what-is-a-garden|Digital Garden]]. I write about open-source software, my tech projects, legal issues, and more. +You're on a [[Misc/what-is-a-garden|Digital Garden]] dedicated to open-source use and contribution, legal issues in tech, and more. + +For a monthly list of what's new on the site, subscribe to the [Updates RSS feed](/Updates.xml). ## Important Links -[[about-me|About Me]] | [[curated|Recommended Reading]] | [[Misc/disclaimers|Disclaimers/Terms of Use]] | [Monthly Changelog](/Updates) | Mastodon +[[about-me|About Me]] | [[curated|Recommended Reading]] | [[Misc/disclaimers|Disclaimers/Terms of Use]] | [[/Updates|Monthly Changelog]] | Mastodon

not legal advice 🤟 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/content/templates/new-note.md b/content/templates/new-note.md index f0072f7eb..e73ef4960 100644 --- a/content/templates/new-note.md +++ b/content/templates/new-note.md @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ --- title: New Note -tags: [] +tags: date: <% tp.date.now("yyyy-MM-DD") %> +lastmod: <% tp.date.now("yyyy-MM-DD") %> --- diff --git a/quartz.layout.ts b/quartz.layout.ts index f4de4d01b..14e8a8f45 100644 --- a/quartz.layout.ts +++ b/quartz.layout.ts @@ -29,13 +29,18 @@ export const defaultContentPageLayout: PageLayout = { Component.Darkmode(), Component.DesktopOnly(Component.Explorer({ sortFn: (a, b) => { + const emojis = /([\u2700-\u27BF]|[\uE000-\uF8FF]|\uD83C[\uDC00-\uDFFF]|\uD83D[\uDC00-\uDFFF]|[\u2011-\u26FF]|\uD83E[\uDD10-\uDDFF])/g + const a_name = a.name.replace(emojis, '').trim() + const a_dname = a.displayName.replace(emojis, '').trim() + const b_name = b.name.replace(emojis, '').trim() + const b_dname = b.displayName.replace(emojis, '').trim() // Sort order: folders first, then files. Sort folders and files alphabetically - if (a.name.match(/Home$/)) { return -1 } - if (b.name.match(/Home$/)) { return 1 } + if (/^.*Home$/.test(a_dname)) { return -1 } + if (/^.*Home$/.test(b_dname)) { return 1 } if ((!a.file && !b.file) || (a.file && b.file)) { // numeric: true: Whether numeric collation should be used, such that "1" < "2" < "10" // sensitivity: "base": Only strings that differ in base letters compare as unequal. Examples: a ≠ b, a = á, a = A - return a.displayName.localeCompare(b.displayName, undefined, { + return a_dname.localeCompare(b_dname, undefined, { numeric: true, sensitivity: "base", }) diff --git a/quartz/components/pages/FolderContent.tsx b/quartz/components/pages/FolderContent.tsx index d3f28ddf1..969c3de4b 100644 --- a/quartz/components/pages/FolderContent.tsx +++ b/quartz/components/pages/FolderContent.tsx @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ export default ((opts?: Partial) => {

{content}

- {options.showFolderCount && ( + {options.showFolderCount && allPagesInFolder.length != 0 && (

{i18n(cfg.locale).pages.folderContent.itemsUnderFolder({ count: allPagesInFolder.length, diff --git a/quartz/components/pages/TagContent.tsx b/quartz/components/pages/TagContent.tsx index 19452ec44..40b970be7 100644 --- a/quartz/components/pages/TagContent.tsx +++ b/quartz/components/pages/TagContent.tsx @@ -90,7 +90,13 @@ function TagContent(props: QuartzComponentProps) {

{content}
-

{i18n(cfg.locale).pages.tagContent.itemsUnderTag({ count: pages.length })}

+ {pages.length != 0 && ( +

+ {i18n(cfg.locale).pages.tagContent.itemsUnderTag({ + count: pages.length + })} +

+ )}